Does Europe Need a New Security Architecture?

The question whether Europe and the world need a new transatlantic or global “architecture” of security is a recurring item on the agenda of the debate on security. The fundamental internal transformation of many Central – and East-European states which shed Soviet domination after the break-up of the Soviet Union, and after the end of the Cold War and of a bi-polar world, offer a point of departure for reflection and a search for new, holisitc – comprehensive arrangement of the international system. This matter has been the subject of many serious analysis and studies.

On 8 October 2008 the president of the Russian Federation Dimitri Medvedev presented an initiative at a Global Policy Forum in Evian organized by the French Institute of International Affairs. Having analyzed and assessed the development of global political situation since the collapse of the bipolar system, Medvedev proposed a new comprehensive European Security Treaty. The aim of The Treaty – declared the Russian president – would be to introduce “uniform rules of the game” across the transatlantic area. The agreement would be of a legally binding nature and it would provide security guarantees for all its signatories. In such a way, Russia was proposing a New Architecture of Security. That was by no means the first Russian initiative to this end. Indeed, Russia has a long record of promoting comprehensive security concepts.

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2 Address by the President of the Russian Federation Dimitri Medvedev, Evian, 8 October 2008.
Adam Czartoryski’s 1803 Memorandum

The first Russian initiative to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of security issues and to establish a European order guaranteed by the great powers was proposed over two hundred years ago. The author of concept, Duke Adam Czartoryski, was a Polish aristocrat whom the Tsar of Russia Alexander I had put in charge of a newly established Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Initially, the young Russian monarch did not intend to address European affairs. Adam Czartoryski wrote in his memoirs: “The Emperor spoke of Catherine’s wars and of the despotic folly of Paul with the same disgust”\(^3\). Yet Czartoryski as the foreign minister of the Russian Empire believed that Russia’s isolation was leading it to lose any significance in Europe and to suffer humiliation – and for this reason it would never be endorsed by public opinion. He wrote: “To move ahead one needs a goal that has yet to be achieved. And for progress to be permanent one must be capable of creating an unachievable goal”\(^4\).

Russia – wrote Czartoryski in the 1803 memorandum for the Tsar\(^5\) – is not by nature an aggressive power. Her territory is too vast as it is. The future of Russia, argued Czartoryski, should rely on the development and exploitation of her own lands rather than on new conquests. Yet Russia must play a role befitting her potential: her policy must be “magnanimous and matching her position and power”\(^6\). Her future should be shaped by the process of taming of her giant territory rather than by further conquests. Yet isolation would be a proof of her weakness – hence Czartoryski’s conclusion that Russia’s geographic situation and its might forced it, as it were, to conduct active foreign policy. In his concept he suggested concrete steps towards liberating the Slavonic nations in the Balkan Peninsula for whom Russia should be the protector.

Czartoryski saw England as a unique and invaluable trade partner and a potential ally, for, while intent on establishing security in Europe, it was also the last bastion of

\(^4\) M. Kukiel, Czartoryski a jedność Europy 1770–1861, [Czartoryski and European unity], translated by J.M. Kłoczowski, Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Lublin 2008, p. 67.
\(^5\) This document, never published in Russia, was discovered by Marian Kukiel in the 1930s in the archives of the Czartoryski Museum in Kraków and presented in his work Czartoryski and European Unity, 1770–1861, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1955. [Published in Polish as: M. Kukiel, Czartoryski a jedność..., op. cit.]
\(^6\) M. Kukiel, Czartoryski a jedność..., op. cit., p. 67.
liberalism which had been effectively banished from the continental Europe. This is how Mikhail Heller summarized the gist of the Czartoryski concept: “If Russia and England come to terms, their policy will be law for the entire continent”7. On this logic, an alliance with Britain was to be the foundation of the foreign policy program of the then Russia. According to Czartoryski’s memorandum, there was no conflict of interests between Russia and France. Czartoryski held that, to challenge the French revolutionary ideals, liberalism needed to be promoted and French public opinion won over against the tyranny of Napoleon.

Predictably, the cause of Poland figured prominently in the Czartoryski concept. Following the partition of Poland, Austria and Prussia became Russia’s neighbors. The author of the memorandum warned the Tsar against the dangers this neighborhood engendered – for instance, a potential attack of German states on Russia could not be ruled out. For this reason, he argued, the rebirth of a united Poland would ensure Russia’s security. The memorandum contained concrete proposals for Russia’s policy towards Turkey (Czartoryski held that the Ottoman empire was in a terminal stage), a recommendation that Greece be created as an independent state, plans for the unification of the Balkan Slavs and of Italy and, last but not least, for the establishment of a confederation (following the Swiss pattern), or a federation (modeled upon the United States) of western German states independent from Austria and Prussia.

The plan met with the Emperor’s enthusiastic support. Adam Czartoryski was appointed Russian minister of foreign affairs. Acting on the memorandum, Alexander I signed “Secret Instructions” and handed them in September 1804 to Nikolai Novosiltsov who was dispatched on a special mission to London. The essence of Novosiltsov’s mission was this: two great powers, Russia and England, were to decide the future of the European continent, setting the borders and determining the institutions and political systems of those states which would find themselves in a Russian-British condominium rather than under Bonaparte’s rule. The talks Novosiltsov conducted in London dealt with two issues: on the one hand – the formation of a special body to oversee the protection and preservation of peace in Europe and, on the other hand – the drawing up of new borders of the existing states and the creation of new states once Napoleon was defeated.

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7 M. Heller, Istoriya Rossiyskoy..., op. cit., p. 257
In other words, as Polish historian Kukiel wrote: “Ensuring stability of such a Europe should be a common task of Russia and England. [...] They should use their combined force to establish equilibrium and a true and lasting peace”\(^8\).

As we know, history ran a different course. The logical, bold and innovative thinking of the Czartoryski plan did not impact the European reality in any meaningful way and neither did it determine Russia’s place and role in Europe and in the world. Shortly after, a war broke out between Alexander I and Napoleon. The great Russian victory in the battle of Borodino and Napoleon’s defeat failed to give Russia a hegemony in Europe. An attempt to win for Russia a position of being able to sway the fate of Europe fell flat. Nearly two hundred years later Alexander Solzhenitzyn asked, in his assessment of Alexander I: “Why did we meddle in European affairs?”\(^9\)

A New “Triple Concert”

A different position on this issue was presented by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei Lavrov who, in his lecture inaugurating the academic year 2007/2008 at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), said on this subject: ‘Conditions of freedom dictate the necessity of collective leadership by the key states of the world. This may be called a “concert of the powers for the 21\(^{st}\) century.” [...] It wouldn’t hurt the part of the world customarily known as the Euro-Atlantic region to have a triple understanding – between the US, Russia and the European Union. [...] I agree that such a “troika” could “steer the global boat into untroubled waters.” Within this “triangle” there are things on which Europe is closer to the US, but on a number of strategic issues it has more similarity with Russia. Take the theme of using force and other forms of coercion, and also the attitude to international law. Despite differences in the “troika,” we must seek to arrive at the highest-possible common denominator. Anyway, if some people think that it’s impossible to do without a concept of containment, then this kind of “triple concert” is the best – and most importantly – a non-confrontational and non-cost form of mutual containment. Perhaps it is time to think of a new definition of Atlanticism that does not

\(^{8}\) M. Kukiel, *Czartoryski a jedność..., op. cit.*, p. 60.

exclude Russia.'10 Thus Lavrov. This concept was later developed by Vladimir Putin and recently presented by the Russian President Dimitri Medvedev at the Evian Global Security Conference (8 Oct. 2008).

The political philosophy behind Russian policy is based on a new interpretation of the old concept of the balance of power, which, according to the Russian foreign minister, has not changed: ‘Russia has now borne a considerable share of the burden of maintaining the balance of power in European and world politics for 300 years.’11 According to Russia’s head of diplomacy, the element of continuity in Russia’s foreign policy has greater significance than the fundamental changes that have taken place on the European and world stage. The formula of the balance of power in international politics is based, according to Lavrov, on ‘peaceful coexistence, reliance upon international law, collective security, and the political-diplomatic settlement of conflicts.’12 In this respect, the statements of President Vladimir Putin were more overt. Their guiding motive was not the search for a balance of interests as much as recognition of the new Russia as a global power – with a position in the world equal to that of the United States. In other words, it is a policy aimed at Russia’s recovery – in a radically changed world – of the rank once occupied by the Soviet Union in the bipolar system. In reaching these aims, the decisive factors that have influenced Russia’s changing approach to global issues have not been world developments in themselves so much as the changing situation in Russia itself.

Two factors are of key importance in Russia’s new approach to resolving current and future problems in the world and in Europe: its possession of the world’s largest nuclear-weapon arsenal and delivery system13 along with the United States, and its

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10 Speech given by Russia’s foreign minister, S. V. Lavrov at the inauguration of the new academic year at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow, 3 September 2007. For full text of the speech, see http://www.sras.org/sergey_lavrov_speaks_at_mgimo.
11 Ibidem.
12 Ibidem.
13 In 2007, nuclear states had a total of over 26,000 nuclear warheads, of which the United States had about 10,000 (including 5,045 issued to the army and kept in a state of alert), Russia about 15,000 (including about 5,700 deployed in alert, and 9,300 kept in warehouses and destined to be destroyed). See SIPRI Yearbook 2007, Appendix 12 A, table 12A.1. At the beginning of 2008 eight nuclear weapons states possessed almost 10,200 operational nuclear weapons. Among the total number of deployed warheads Russia has 5,189 and the U.U. – 4,075. See – SIPRI Yearbook 2008, Chapter 8. The United States and Russia undertook to reduce their strategic nuclear potential to the level of 1,700-2,200 nuclear warheads by 31 December 2012. The destruction of the Russian nuclear potential (and of other weapons of mass destruction) is financed from a special fund within the
enormous resources of energy raw materials (gas and oil), for which world demand is rising. These resources are not renewable. Increased demand, along with increasingly difficult access to these strategic resources, has caused their prices to skyrocket (fivefold in five years – 2003-2008), but additionally, access to these resources is becoming an important lever in the security policy of states, as well as an instrument of pressure and blackmail.

On 10 February 2007, at the Munich Security Policy Conference, Russian president Vladimir Putin declared: ‘I am convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security.’ The principal aim of the Russian president was to question the American dominant position in the world in all possible spheres – political, economic, and military. He also used the opportunity to criticize institutions that have significant achievements to their account in the process of the peaceful transformation of the international system. Thus, he accused Western countries of transforming the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) into a ‘vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries’ at the expense of others. He questioned the rationale behind the deployment in Europe of the U.S. missile defense shield. Several months later, on 4 June 2007, in a conversation with journalists from G8 member states, President Putin predicted a new arms race, while at the same time rejecting Russian responsibility for ‘improving [Russian] strategic nuclear weapons.’ Missile defense, Putin explained, disrupts the strategic balance. ‘In order to restore that balance without setting up a missile defense system we will have to create a system to overcome missile defense, and this is what we are doing now.’

The draft of the new European Security Treaty presented by President Medvedev in Evian does not represent a new concept. It recalls rather Gustav Stresemann’s way of thinking reflected in the Locarno Pacts of 1925. Stresemann, the Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic intended to re-establish the position of Germany after defeat

framework of the international GTR – Global Threat Reduction program, to the amount of 20 billion USD; 10 billion were provided by the United States, the other 10 billion by other Western states).

14 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html
15 Ibidem.
16 ‘[…] we will absolve ourselves from the responsibility of our retaliatory steps because we are not initiating what is certainly growing into a new arms race in Europe.’ See: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article17855.htm
17 Ibidem.
in the First World War. To some extent this is the main motive behind Russia’s recent initiative: to institutionalize the global power position of Russia after defeat in the Cold War.

**A Search for a New Concert of Powers**

The European security concept put forth by Vladimir Putin, Dmitri Medvedev and Sergei Lavrov rests on an assumption that a new architecture of security will be based on decisions taken by the great powers. In its essence, this concept draws on the 19th century European order formula established and upheld by the Holy Alliance – a pact of the monarchies which had defeated Napoleon. That concert of European powers stabilized, for several generations, situation on the continent. The outcome of World War I came as a fundamental shock to the then European system. Three great monarchies: Austria-Hungary, the German Empire and the Tsarist Russia, collapsed, as did the vast Ottoman Empire. The victorious powers – the United States, France and England – dictated the terms that shaped a new system. This was reflected, in the legal-political sense, in the Versailles Treaty which included, as its integral part, the Pact of the League of Nations seen as an institutional form of a new collective security system.

In practice, the system did not pass the test, for a number of reasons – not so much because of institutional weaknesses of the League of Nations (which were many), as due to what amounted in fact to the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty by two powers, Germany and Russia. In both these states the form of governance had changed fundamentally: the German Empire had been succeeded by the Weimar Republic and the Russian Empire – by the rule of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Federation which, subsequently (since 1922) was to be known as the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Yet in the external policies of the both powers the element of continuity and efforts to regain the one-time greatness dominated. The Weimar Republic openly defied the Versailles system. This was reflected first in its attempts to establish special relations with Russia (an arrangement of Rapallo, 1922), then in the Locarno guarantee treaties (1925) which, while ensuring the security of the Western neighbors of Germany’s, left it free to resume the policy of eastward expansion. On Hitler’s coming to power the Third Reich no longer observed the constraints imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty. The Saar Land came back
under German rule as the result of the [Saar] plebiscite and the remilitarization of the Rhine zone followed (1936). Then came the Anschluss of Austria (March 1938), the severing of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia under the Munich Treaty (September 1938), the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the dismantling of the Czechoslovak state (March 1939) and, finally, the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (August 1939) and the invasion of Poland (1 September 1939) two weeks before the onslaught and seizure by the Red Army of the eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland. An accord of the aggressors, Hitler and Stalin, was to terminate the existence of an independent Poland which the Soviet signatory of the treaty, Viacheslav Molotov, called on that occasion a bastard of the Versailles Treaty.

Litvinov’s Collective Security Concept

Hitler’s Germany openly repudiated the Versailles Treaty, proclaimed a revision-of-borders policy and heralded each new act of its aggression in the East as the final step towards “a lasting peace and security”. Hitler’s officially declared aim was to establish a “new order” in Europe. Stalin’s Soviet Union, for its part, officially flaunted its peaceful intentions and promoted the need to build a collective security system in Europe. The chief architect of a comprehensive concept of European collective security in the 1930s was Maxim Litvinov, the then Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Addressing the 16th session of the League of Nations devoted to the attack on Abyssinia by Mussolini’s Italy, Litvinov outlined a concept of the indivisibility of peace and the perpetuation of collective security. On 1 July 1936 Litvinov argued in Geneva: “[...] if we are incapable today of raising to this high level of international solidarity, then care should be taken that all continents, or – to begin with – at least the entire Europe, are linked by a network of regional agreements binding the different groups of states to defend the different regions against aggressors, the discharge of these regional duties to be regarded on a par with the discharge of duties under the Covenant and to receive full support of all members of the League of Nations”18.

The substance of Litvinov’s idea was that the principle of collective security should be implemented and that, far from being an abstract commodity, this principle was a practical means of ensuring security for all nations, i.e. of recognizing the indivisibility of peace.

**The Words and Deeds**

These words of Litvinov’s are worth recalling because deliberations on a new architecture of security inevitably invite a question: Do proclaimed purposes reflect true intentions, or are they just propaganda rhetorics?

In order to illustrate what I have in mind I would like to recollect here a personal experience. It happened in the morning of 14 December 1992 in Stockholm, just as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Margaretha af Ugglas was opening a meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. My seat was near to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski. I had been invited to the Ministerial Council meeting to submit a preliminary report on a mission entrusted to me, of looking for a political solution to the conflict triggered by the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester Republic’s secession from Moldova. Suddenly Andrei Kozyryev, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation made a point of order and requested to speak outside the agenda. He explained that he had received instructions to make a brief statement before the meeting proceeded with its business. At the time, as we know, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyryev were declaring their unequivocal and unreserved commitment to the policy of rapprochement and close cooperation with the community of democratic Western states.

I was sitting less than one meter away from Minister Kozyryev, who reached into his coat pocket, smoothed a crumpled sheet of paper, and read out the following statement:

“I must introduce corrections in the concept of Russian foreign policy, about the part of which concerning CSCE problems I wish to inform you briefly.

First: While fully maintaining the policy of entry into Europe, we clearly recognise that our traditions in many respects, if not fundamentally, lie in Asia, and this sets limits to our rapprochement with Western Europe.
We see, alongside some evolution, essentially unchanged strategies on the part of NATO and WEU which are drawing up plans to strengthen their military presence in the Baltic and other regions of the territory of the former Soviet Union and to interfere in Bosnia and the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.

Clearly, sanctions against the FRY were dictated by this policy. We demand that they be lifted, and if this does not happen, we reserve our right to take the necessary unilateral measures to defend our interests, especially since they cause us economic harm. In its struggle the present Government of Serbia can count on the support of the great Russia.

Second: The space of the former Soviet Union cannot be regarded as a zone of full application of CSCE norms. In essence, this is a post-imperial space, in which Russia has to defend its interests, using all available means, including military and economic means. We shall strongly insist that the former USSR Republics join without delay the new Federation or Confederation, and there will be tough talks on this matter.

Third: All those who think that they can disregard these particularities and interests, that Russia will undergo the fate of the Soviet Union, should not forget that we are talking of a State that is capable of standing up for itself and its friends. We are, of course, ready to play a constructive part in the work of the CSCE Council, although we shall be very cautious in our approach to ideas leading to interference in internal affairs”.

He wound up his statement by adding: “I reserve the right to speak again on specific items”. The audience was consterned in silence. After a while Ms af Ugglas announced a coffee break. There was an immense agitation among the delegates. The foreign ministers of the great powers met with the Russian representative. After twenty minutes we returned to the conference room. Minister Andrei Kozyryev resumed the floor as the first speaker and he explained that his previous speech had been a rhetoric trick meant to bring home to Europe and the world what Russian policy could be like if President Yeltsin lost power. “I would like to assure you and all others present that neither President Yeltsin, who remains the leader and guarantor of Russian domestic and foreign policy, nor I myself, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, would ever agree with what I read out in my previous statement. (...) The text which I read out previously is a fairly accurate compilation of the demands of the opposition, and not just the most radical opposition in Russia. (...) I would like to conclude this
rhetorical part of my statement”. He concluded by explaining: “It was simply a device aimed at bringing home the danger of an alternative course of events”.

If truth be told, what Andrei Kozyryev treated as a rhetoric trick has long been a reality. Georgia was told to forget about the principle of territorial integrity of states as far as it was concerned – a fact driven home by the recognition of legality of the secession of two Georgian provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As for non-intervention or non-interference in internal affairs, this principle (much-invoked and strongly abused in the Soviet period when it was referred to as a shield to protect a violation of human rights, suppression of democratic opposition, and constraints on freedom of expression and when the totalitarian mono-party state was identified with the rule-of-law state) is again treated as a shield with which to camouflage the façade nature of the legal procedures and institutions which by rights should be safeguarding civil rights, freedoms and liberties.

Universal values (human rights, civil liberties, freedom of expression), while paid lip service to, are not accompanied by any procedures and mechanisms ensuring that international commitments undertaken under the auspices of multilateral security institutions (such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe) are met. Andrei Kozyryev’s rhetoric trick, meant as a warning and a self-defeating prognosis, turned out in fact a harbinger of things to come. And come they did – in a much broader scope than the author of that long forgotten statement could have foreseen.

**Security concept: continuity and change**

Shaping a system of European security is part of policy of practically all European nations – Central, Northern, Eastern, Western and Southern European states. Transatlantic security is a concern of the United States, Russia, France, the U.K., Germany and Poland, as well. All politicians of our region are speaking about European security. As a rule they have in mind the security of their own state. In other words, the effectiveness of the system depends not so much on the form (alliance, treaty, declaration or another undertaking) and nature of commitments (be they legal or moral-political) as on the harmonization of interests and on the political will of the states to create the system. The security of one state or group of states cannot be constructed to the detriment of the security of others.
The collapse of the bi-polar world prompted policymakers and experts to look for a new security formulas: of *common security* or *co-operative security*. These concepts differ from those of the Cold War by their new axiology: *common security* and *cooperative security* are based on a political philosophy of *inclusiveness* rather than *exclusiveness*. There are also some transitory in-between forms – much looser than legal commitments, as evidenced, for example, by the process which, commenced in Helsinki and led to the establishment of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The OSCE encompasses, without any exception, all states in the transatlantic area: Europe, Russia, the United States, Canada and the Central Asian states. The strength of this structure lies not only in its universality of membership, but in the *comprehensiveness* of commitments which extend to practically all dimensions of life: political (including military aspects), social, economic and cultural-civilizational (human contacts, information, culture, education). The main weakness of the OSCE is that it provides more of a deliberatory forum for consultations, debates and reviews than for operational activity. Even then, the flexible nature of the OSCE institutions and their capacity for *ad-hoc* conflict prevention activities is not without significance. The effectiveness of this approach depends chiefly on a degree of mutual confidence among states. The OSCE has an advantage over other security institutions in that it has instruments and mechanisms to shape and monitor situations *within* the states rather than *between* them. After the end of the Cold War major threats and risks of conflicts within the transatlantic area have arisen from internal developments rather than from conflicts of interests and tensions between the states. These conflicts predominately ethnic, national and religious, call for a qualitatively new and different approach to crisis management, different from instruments designed to prevent international wars – between the states. The system of military confidence – and security – building measures (CSBMs) is an example of means inadequate for new challenges and threats. Designed to prevent conflicts between states, the CSBMs have not been adjusted to regulate intra-state situations and, for this reason, they failed to perform as intended either in the south of Russia, in the North Caucasus, or the Balkans when following the collapse of Yugoslavia wars broke out between one-time republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
North Atlantic Alliance established a network of security institutions – like Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions and other. They do represent another category of security system emerged after the end of the Cold War. Broadly construed, a security system for the 21st century should take into account the human security dimension which encompasses both human (individual) rights and the rights of minorities. This broad construction of security implies commitment to respect the principles and values of the rule-of-law state, which include political pluralism, market economy, and respect for freedom of press and other civic and political liberties. Respect of these norms and principles is a cornerstone binding on all European Union member states. Also the member states of the Council of Europe are bound to observe these norms. The set of legal instruments is considered a European code of conduct for the States both towards their own citizens and towards the other signatories of the conventions adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe.

This sketchy review of security organizations, structures and institutions raises the question of the relevance and need for agreeing a new document to create, under international law, a basis for building a European or transatlantic security system. One thing is certain: Europe is not short of institutions, norms and regulations. We have more than enough institutions, procedures and norms. Indeed, these are in oversupply. Such being the case, when initiatives concerning a treaty on European security system are proposed, it is worthwhile to find out what their “added value” is supposed to be.

Russian proposals are hardly new. Suffice it to recall Mikhail Gorbachev’s initiative of the end of 1980s, to build, as part of the perestroika policy, a united democratic Europe – “our common European home”. Public statements of Russian leaders – Vladimir Putin, Dimitri Medvedev and Sergei Lavrov – have been more a manifestation of continuity of Russian political way of thinking than an answer to the change which occurred in Europe in the past twenty years.

After the collapse of the USSR President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin radically changed his position on respecting human rights within the framework of the process commenced in Helsinki. In fact, though, this shift and the process of getting closer to the policy of the democratic community of Western states had been prepared and launched by Mikhail Gorbachev. As the result, many fundamental
documents could be agreed, including the *Paris Charter for a New Europe* (1990) and a fundamental document adopted at the 1992 Helsinki summit, *The Challenges of Change*.

The matter of eastward extention of the North Atlantic Alliance also came on the agenda. Russia’s position was highly critical. While the rhetoric of official Russian documents drew directly on Soviet propaganda, in his correspondence with the Western leaders Boris Yeltsin used a very different language. In his letter to Bill Clinton of 15 September 1993 the Russian president wrote: “The main threat to Europe is now posed not by the East-West confrontation, but by inter-ethnic conflicts of a new generation. (…) We understand, of course, that a possible integration of East European countries with NATO will not automatically produce a situation where the Alliance would somehow turn against Russia. We do not see NATO as a block opposing us. But it is important to take into account how our public opinion may react to such a step. Not only the opposition, but the moderates, too, would no doubt see this as a sort of neo-isolation of the country as opposed to its natural introduction into the Euro-Atlantic space”.

In other words, in his argument Yeltsin expressed an idea that while NATO was not an aggressive pact, propaganda did its work and the president of Russia had to reckon with this. On 15 September 1993 he wrote in a confidential letter19 to the four Western leaders (the U.S.A., the U.K., France and Germany): “And generally, we favor a situation where the relations between our country and NATO would be by several degrees warmer than those between the Alliance and Eastern Europe” and he went on to suggest: “NATO-Russia rapprochement, including through their interaction in the peace-making area, should proceed on a faster track”. He wrote: “For example, we would be prepared, together with NATO, to offer official security guarantees to the East European states with a focus on ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, and maintenance of peace in the region”. In other words, Russia sought, on the one hand, to prevent by institutional means the enlargement of the Alliance and, on the other hand, to become a guarantor of the independence of states in the Central – and East European region. This would create a grey zone, or a security belt, separating Russia from NATO. This presupposed that

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the states in this corridor would have limited sovereignty, the degree of their independence to be determined by the guarantors, notably Russia and NATO. This approach was not acceptable either to Poland or to other states in the region.

**Security Model and A Treaty Initiative**

In the new situation Russia set out to use the OSCE structures and institutions to rebuild the entire system of relations among European, North American and Central Asian states. On initiative of the Russian Federation the members of the Budapest meeting of the OSCE (5-6 December 1994) decided to develop a common and comprehensive security model for Europe. Within a year over 200 documents and proposals on this matter were submitted for consideration by the ministers of foreign affairs. Intensive, years-long debates failed to produce a new European security system. Andrei Kozyryev proposed a “road map” for arriving at a common model. Stage one would cover conceptualization of the model based on following assumptions: the indivisibility of peace; comprehensiveness and a complex approach; mutually complementing efforts by individual states and multilateral security institutions; bridge-building at different levels, or subsidiarity – the complementing of the bilateral regional, transatlantic dimension. Stage two, focused on “division of labor” among various security institutions, would cover the shaping of model. The third and final stage was meant to be crowned with comprehensive security enshrined in a Great Treaty conducted under international law. This proposal, discussed fifteen years ago at dozen conferences, meetings of experts and diplomats, is now forgotten. Moreover, in 2007 at a Security Conference in Munich, Vladimir Putin severely criticized the same Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe of which Russia had been the initiator and main promoter ten years earlier. President Putin declared in Munich: “I am convinced that we have reached that border line when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security”.

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The gist of the Russian president’s message was to question the United States’ dominant position in the world at all possible levels – political, economic, military. On this occasion he also questioned institutions with an important record of contribution to peaceful transformation of the international system. For instance, he accused the Western partners of transforming the OSCE into “a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries at the expense of other”. He questioned and challenged the sense of deploying in Europe American anti-missile installations. Several months later, talking to Group 8 (G-8) journalists on 4 June 2007, President Putin announced a new arms race and he disclaimed Russia’s responsibility for “efforts to improve [the Russian – A.D.R.] strategic nuclear weapons system”. “Anti-missile defense is destroying the strategic equilibrium” – Putin argued. - “In order to restore that balance without setting up a missile defense system of our own we will have to create a system to overcome the missile defense, and this is what we are doing now.”

Underlying this reasoning was an anachronistic idea that reverting to the doctrine of mutual deterrence could ensure security. Inevitably, the consequence of this doctrine is an arms race. A common U.S.-European anti-missile defense in cooperation with Russia would be much more promising. However, such alternative approach will not result from a decision-making process in which the military and general staffs have the final word. There is a need to demonstrate a new political philosophy corresponding to 21st century requirements. It would neutralize potential threats which are not – and will not – be targeted at Russia from the West, but from the South. It cannot be ruled out that the belligerent tone and the confrontational rhetoric were dictated by internal needs and did not reflect the essence of Russia’s long-term new assertive strategy for relations with the outside world.

President Medvedev’s Plan

8 August 2008 saw the outbreak of the several-days’ war between Russia and Georgia. This war resulted in the secession of two rebel Georgian provinces, Osetia and Abkhazia. Russia recognized them as independent states, in flagrant violation of

22 “[…] we will absolve ourselves from the blame for our retaliatory steps because we are not initiating what is certainly growing into a new arms race in Europe.” See the official website of the Russian President, 4 June 2007.
23 Ibidem.
the principle of territorial integrity of Georgia and inviolability of its borders. Three months later, on 8 October 2008, the President of Russia Dimitri Medvedev declared in Evian24: “Force divorced from law unavoidably breeds unpredictability and chaos when everyone starts fighting each other, as happened in Iraq. Any selective application of the basic provisions of international law undermines international legality”. In this context the President of Russia mentioned Iraq, because it were the Americans who mounted the armed intervention there – but he did not mention Georgia. Medvedev outlined, in five points, the essence of a proposed European security treaty that would set common rules of the game for the whole transatlantic area, from San Francisco and Vancouver to Vladivostok and Kamchatka.

First, the treaty should confirm the basic principles of security in international relations and the readiness to apply them in good faith. Medvedev included to these principles respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of states and respect for all other principles set out in the United Nations Charter.

Point two addressed the inadmissibility of the use of force or threat of its use. The treaty should establish the procedures and mechanisms for peaceful resolution of disputes.

Third, guarantees of equal security – without prejudice to other states, without new lines of division, without development of military alliances that would infringe upon interests of other signatories of the treaty (in this context the Russian President emphasized hard security).

Fourth, no state or international organization can have exclusive rights in respect of maintaining peace and security in Europe.

Fifth, basic arms control parameters and reasonable self-sufficiency in developing military programs. This extends to new procedures and mechanisms for cooperation in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking. Also – added Medvedev – the existing structures should be reviewed for their adequacy to address new tasks and counter threats and challenges.

Understandably enough, Russia’s partners to whom this plan was addressed responded by asking themselves what purpose the new Russian initiative was to

serve. Europe lacks neither institutions and procedures, nor mechanism and legal instruments for ensuring security. The shortage of institutions, principles and norms is not the real problem.

One may raise the question: what are the real motives which prompted Russia to come up again with an European treaty initiative? Certainly, the political motivation is the desire to prevent further enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance, in particular to block Ukraine’s and Georgia’s way to NATO. Presumably, the Russian Federation also wants to agree new instruments. Since being the legal successor of the Soviet Union, Russia prefers to replace the norms negotiated in different conditions by another state, namely by the USSR.

It is only natural and understandable that Russia is seeking to enhance its position in the world. What remains an open issue is what choice the new Russian political elites in power will make. In matters of internal development a discernible shift occurred: from the democratic option launched in the time of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and continued after the collapse of the USSR by Boris Yeltsin, to authoritarian regime which in that country has a centuries-long tradition – starting from Ivan the Terrible’s despotism late in the 16th century, to the policy of opening Russia to Europe, pursued by Peter the Great in the 17th century and Catherine’s empire-building in the 18th century. Attempts at reforming Russia, undertaken late in the 19th century and early in the 20th century by the reformer governments of Prime Ministers Sergey Witte and Pyotr Stolypin, did not go hand in hand either with democracy or with the building of a rule-of-law state. Autocracy dominated. This form of rule enables the concentration and mobilization of resources, in particular for the needs of the military, but it impedes substantially the employment of intellectual potential – that major factors of accelerated modernization of the state in the era of information technology and biotechnology.

At the Munich security conference (8 February 2009) Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy directly addressed the new Russian policy, saying: “Some principles underpinning European security are non-negotiable:

- that we do it with the U.S.;
- that countries are free to choose their alliance; and
that we reject notions such as spheres of privileged influence.”

“Russia knows all this.” – Solana said – “Just as it knows that there are many elements we can work with: the primacy of international law is one. Calls for legally binding instruments and more transparency are good too. Not just in political and military terms, but also for energy and gas”.

Solana’s reply was short, simple and to the point: the European Union is ready to talk, provided the talks are serious, to-the-point and concrete rather than propaganda-like and general. In Russian pursuit of a new architecture of security prevails an abstract and model-type approach with formal-legal aspects over the Western attitude – pragmatic and concrete, such as prevails in American policy. As a rule, models are useful in theoretical deliberations, in the pure sciences – in mathematics, physics, chemistry. Yet international politics and European security operate by different rules. In 21st century relations among states respecting norms and principles and ensuring security of the different states has to be harmonized with respect for the universal values of the rule of law in internal domestic governance of states.

Closing remarks

The breakup of the bipolar system has confronted researchers with the challenge of revising the methodology applied to explain new threats, risks and new challenges. The subsequent shift towards geopolitics was an evidence of intellectual helplessness in explaining the new phenomena rather than of an innovative and creating approach. In practice, seemingly unchallengeable geographical findings have been undermined. For instance, before WWII Poland had been regarded – in accordance with facts – as a Central European country. After the war, shifted 200 kilometers to the west, it was labeled a part of Eastern Europe. Now, in the post-Cold-War period, it is described as a rule as a Central-East European state.

Today Europe gravitates towards the centre. In geopolitical terms, it covers Poland and the Czech Republic, Germany and Austria, Hungary and Slovakia. Other Balkan states, besides Hungary and Romania - namely Croatia and Slovenia - also aspire to

the centre, as does Italy. Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine also consider themselves Central European states\textsuperscript{26}. Political developments have increased the value of “being central” in conditions of stability: it is the peripheries in the South of Europe which have become an area of insecurity and potential conflicts.

The present situation is unique in that Europe enjoys a stability it has not known in nearly 300 years. No European country poses a direct threat to its neighbors. This is due to a number of concurrent factors: the memory of the two great wars which were a disaster for Europe; democratic governance and rule of law which, far from encouraging conflicts among states, offer optimal conditions in which to look for solutions based on compromise and political settlement. Two great European institutions (NATO and the EU) have become a new center of gravity for all European states. Besides ensuring security, they are a practical and appealing example of how national animosities and quarrels can be overcome. They create also suitable external conditions for an optimal internal development and accelerated modernization. It is not without consequence either that the transatlantic security institutions have been capable of successfully promoting universal values and preventing internal conflicts potentially capable of evolving into wars of neighboring states. Under present circumstance the line separating the internal and the external is becoming blurred. A number of norms and principles agreed in Cold War times need to be redefined. This applies in particular to the abstractly construed principle of sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal affairs. These principles should be interpreted in the context of the universal commitment to respect, the rule of law, democratic governance and observe the human rights and rights of minorities. If the proposed New Security Architecture gave these commitments the form of a Treaty conducted under international law, it would be certainly endorsed by all the democratic states – members of the transatlantic community.

\textsuperscript{26} The recognized geometric center of Poland lies in a village of Piątek (between the towns of Lodz and Kutno). Moreover, in Poland this point is also considered the center of Europe, yet several other states, Lithuania and Ukraine among them, also claim the title of the geometric center of Europe. The Austrians describe Vienna as the heart of Europe; the Hungarians give this name to Budapest, the Slovaks – to Bratislava, and the Czechs – to Prague. It illustrates a popular present-day aspiration: to be in the center of Europe rather than on its periphery.